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INTRODUCTION
The California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA) generally
forbids any governmental entity in the state from proceeding with any
project unless it first discloses all of the project's significant
environmental impacts and either mitigates those impacts, if feasible,
or makes a finding that other considerations justify going forward with
the project despite them. When the project is a statewide program
rather than an isolated decision, this creates a potential problem.
Simply complying with CEQA will not be enough. Any mitigation
measure that adopts general standards to govern that program will
likely also be a regulation subject to the California Administrative
Procedure Act (California APA).1
Recently, the California Court of Appeal held that mitigation
measures that meet the Califomia APA's definition of regulation are
subject to that statute's requirements, in addition to CEQA. That case
- Center for Biological Diversity v. Department of Fish & Wildlife
- struck down mitigation measures purporting to regulate the private
fish stocking industry as illegal "underground regulations." 2 An
"underground regulation" includes any rule that meets the California
APA's' broad definition of regulation but was not enacted according
to the statute's procedures.3 Such regulations are categorically
unenforceable.4 Consequently, any agency imposing a mitigation
measure under CEQA that would be considered a regulation under the
1. Center for Biological Diversity v. Dept. of Fish & Wildlife, 234 Cal. App.
4th 214, 259 (2015).
2. Center for Biological Diversity, 234 Cal. App. 4th at 258-64.
3. CAL. CODE REGS. TIT. 1, § 250 (2015).
4. CAL. Gov'T CODE § 11340.5(a) (West 2005 & Supp. 2015).
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California APA will also have to formally adopt the measure as a
regulation before enforcing it.
What will recognition of "underground environmental
regulations" mean for the regulated public? Such recognition will
probably cause a net reduction in regulatory burdens but not without
some cost. The public will benefit from the California APA's
requirement that agencies consider all impacts of their regulations,
rather than just environmental ones. Also, the public will benefit
because the Office of Administrative Law, an outside agency, will
review regulations for consistency, clarity, and necessity. Finally,
broader judicial review of regulations will benefit the public.
However, compliance with the California APA's procedural
requirements may also introduce additional uncertainty and delay.
CEQA generally forbids agencies from proceeding with a project
unless they comply with the mitigation measures contained in the
environmental impact report. Thus, programs may be delayed until
formal adoption of a final regulation. Where delay would impose
substantial costs, the agency has several options. These options
include: (1) framing the mitigation measure to merely require the
agency to pursue rulemaking; (2) adopting an emergency regulation
that allows the program to proceed while the agency pursues formal
adoption or; (3) adopting a statement of overriding consideration that
cites the costs and burdens of delay to allow the program to continue
in the interim. The last option is the most sensible and least likely to
invite unnecessary litigation.
This article is organized into four parts. Part I briefly summarizes
CEQA. Part II introduces the California APA and its prohibition
against underground regulations. Part III explains why underground
environmental regulations are invalid for being inconsistent with the
California APA. Part IV addresses how underground regulations'
invalidity will impact the regulated public. Part IV also discusses
agencies' options to reduce adverse impacts.
I. CEQA
CEQA, like its federal counterpart, the National Environmental
Policy Act, requires state and local agencies to publicly disclose all
significant environmental impacts from any projects that the agencies
approve or carry out. CEQA also requires the agencies to either
2015] 3
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mitigate those impacts or explain why other considerations warrant
allowing the project to proceed despite the impacts.5 CEQA's reach is
as sweeping as its purposes, which include to "[d]evelop and maintain
a high-quality environment now and in the future, and take all action
necessary to protect, rehabilitate, and enhance the environmental
quality of the state." 6 These actions include consideration of aesthetic,
scenic, and historical values; impacts on air, water, wildlife; and noise
levels.7 Although CEQA requires consideration of all significant
environmental impacts, it does not forbid agencies from approving
projects that have such impacts.8 Rather, its core purpose is to
promote informed public decision-making, at least with regard to
environmental impacts. 9
5. See CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 21065 (West 2007 & Supp. 2015); CAL. CODE
REG. TIT. 14, § 15002 (2015). CEQA does not apply to private activities, unless they
involve government participation, financing, or approval (i.e., permitting). CAL.
CODE REG. TIT. 14, § 15002(c); see Sean Stuart Varner, The California
Environmental Quality Act (CEQA) After Two Decades: Relevant Problems and
Ideas for Necessary Reform, 19 PEPP. L. REv. 1447, 1455-57 (1992). The CEQA
Guidelines, codified in Title 14 of the California Code of Regulations, are accorded
great weight by courts when interpreting CEQA. See Muzzy Ranch Co. v. Solano
Cty. Airport Land Use Comm'n, 41 Cal. 4th 372, 380 n.2 (2007).
6. CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 21001(a) (West 2007 & Supp. 2015).
7. See Todd Nelson, Save Tara and the Modern State of the California
Environmental Quality Act, 45 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 289, 294-95 (2011); see also CAL.
PUB. RES. CODE § 21001 (West 2007 & Supp. 2015). These impacts are evaluated
compared to an environmental "baseline," which is usually what the environment
would look like if the project did not proceed. Megan McQueeney, Note, Baseline in
the Sand: Communities for a Better Environment v. South Coast Air Quality
Management District, 38 ECOLOGY L.Q. 293 (2011).
8. An agency may allow a project to go forward notwithstanding significant
environmental impacts by finding mitigation infeasible and adopting a statement of
overriding considerations to explain why other factors outweigh those impacts. CAL.
PUB. RES. CODE § 21093 (West 2007 & Supp. 2015); CAL. CODE REGS. TIT. 14, §
15002(h) (2015).
9. See In re Bay-Delta Programmatic Environmental Impact Report
Coordinated Proceedings, 43 Cal. 4th 1143, 1162 (2008). Although CEQA permits
agencies to allow environmental impacts where there are significant social,
economic, or recreational benefits to offset them, it does not directly require an
agency to analyze these non-environmental impacts. See Laurel Heights
Improvement Assoc. v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 6 Cal. 4th 1112, 1123 (1993);
Citizens of Goleta Valley v. Board of Supervisors, 52 Cal. 3d 553, 564 (1990); CAL.
CODE REGS. TIT. 14, § 15003(j) (2015).
4 [Vol. 52
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Ordinarily, an agency proceeds through three steps in the CEQA
process.10 First, it determines whether the project is subject to CEQA
at all." A project is exempt from CEQA if it would obviously not
have a significant effect on the environment. 12 Projects subject to a
statutory exemption are also exempt.1 3 Unless the project is exempt,
the agency prepares an initial study to determine whether the project
may have a significant effect on the environment. 14 If the initial study
does not yield substantial evidence of any significant environmental
impacts, the agency prepares a "negative declaration" and the project
can proceed without further review.15  The project proponent or the
government may also modify the project to avoid the significant
environmental effect and adopt a "mitigated negative declaration." 1 6
But, if the initial study concludes that the project may have some
significant environmental impact, the agency generally must prepare
an "environmental impact report" or "EIR."l 7 That report is "the heart
of CEQA."'8 The report must "identify the significant effects on the
environment of a project, . . . identify alternatives to the project,
and ... indicate the manner in which those significant effects can be
10. CAL. CODE REGS. TIT. 14, § 15002(k) (2015).
11. CAL. CODE REGS. TIT. 14,§§ 15061, 15062 (2015).
12. CAL. CODE REGS. TIT. 14,§ 15061 (2015).
13. See CAL. CODE REGS. TIT. 14, §§ 15061, 15261-15333 (2015).
14. CAL. CODE REGS. TIT. 14, § 15063 (2015). Due to uncertainty, it can often
be difficult to determine whether a potential environmental impact is significant.
John Watts, Reconciling Environmental Protections with the Need for Certainty:
Significance Thresholds for CEQA, 22 ECOLOGY L.Q. 213 (1995); see Laurel
Heights Improvement Assn., 47 Cal. 3d 395 (1988). These determinations also often
end up the subject of litigation. See Varner, supra note 5, at 1457-66.
15. CAL. CODE REGS. TIT. 14, §§ 15070 (2015).
16. CAL. CODE. REGS. TIT. 14, § 15070(b) (2015); see Gentry v. City of
Murrieta, 36 Cal. App. 4th 1359, 1373 (1995).
17. CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 21080(d) (West 2007 & Supp. 2015); CAL. CODE
REGS. TIT. 14, § 15080 (2015); Laurel Heights Improvement Assn., 47 Cal. 3d at 392
(citing CAL. CODE REGS., TIT. 14, § 15003 (2015); Cty. of Inyo v. Yorty, 32 Cal.
App. 3d 795, 810 (1973)).
18. See Yorty, 32 Cal. App. 3d 795, 810 (1973); see also Laurel Heights
Improvement Assn., 47 Cal. 3d at 392.
6
California Western Law Review, Vol. 52 [2015], No. 1, Art. 2
https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwlr/vol52/iss1/2
CALIFORNIA WESTERN LAW REVIEW
mitigated or avoided." 9 The result is often a voluminous report
spanning several thousand pages. 2 0
The process begins with a draft environmental impact report. The
draft must identify the project's basic objectives so that the agency
and the public can assess the project's benefits, alternatives, and
potential mitigation options. 2 1 The draft report must "describe a range
of reasonable alternatives to the project ... which would feasibly
attain most of the basic objectives of the project but would avoid or
substantially lessen any of the significant effects of the project, and
evaluate the comparative merits of the alternatives."2 2 This list of
alternatives must include a "no project" alternative that compares the
impacts of the project to the effects of not undertaking the project. 23
The draft report must identify the environmental impacts of each
alternative and mitigation measures to reduce the significance of the
impacts. 2 4
After preparing the draft report, the agency must make it available
for public comment. 2 5 The agency must "consider" and "evaluate"
every comment submitted on the draft and prepare a written response
to each significant environmental issue raised by a commenter. 26 The
19. CAL. PUB. RES. CODE §§ 21002.1(a) (West 2007 & Supp. 2015).
20. See, e.g., California Department of Fish and Wildlife, Final Environmental
Impact Report for Hatchery Operations (Jan. 11, 2010),
https://www.dfg.ca.gov/fish/Hatcheries/EIR/ [hereinafter Fish Stocking EIR] (EIR
spanning tens of thousands of pages).
21. CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 21081(b) (West 2007 & Supp. 2015); CAL. CODE
REGS. TIT. 14, § 15093(a) (2015); see Sara Wimberger, Note, Consideration of
Alternatives in Environmental Impact Reports: The Importance of CEQA's
Procedural Requirements, 36 ECOLOGY L.Q. 499 (2009).
22. CAL. CODE REGS. TIT. 14, § 15126.6(a) (2015); see Laurel Heights
Improvement Assn. 47 Cal. 3d at 399-403 (1988).
23. CAL. CODE REGS. TIT. 14, § 15126.6(a) (2015); see Save Tara v. City of
West Hollywood, 45 Cal. 4th 116, 138-39 (2008).
24. CAL. CODE REGS. TIT. 14, § 15091 (2015).
25. CAL. PUB. RES. CODE §§ 21091, 21092 (West 2007 & Supp. 2015); CAL.
CODE REGS. TIT. 14, §§ 15087, 15105(a) (2015).
26. CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 21091(d) (West 2007 & Supp. 2015); CAL. CODE
REGS. TIT. 14, § 15088(c) (2015).
6 [Vol. 52
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draft, public comments, and agency responses are then all included in
a final environmental impact report for the agency's final review. 27
A project that will have a significant effect on the environment
cannot be approved unless: (1) the final environmental impact report
includes feasible and enforceable mitigation measures that reduce the
effect to insignificance; (2) the effect is avoided through the adoption
of an alternative or; (3) mitigation is infeasible and the project's
overriding benefits outweigh the significant effect.28
To streamline the CEQA process for ongoing government
programs, or where many similar projects would otherwise have to go
29through review, an agency can "tier" the environmental review
process. 30 The agency tiers the review process by addressing
environmental impacts and mitigation requirements common to the
program as a whole in a program environmental impact report and
addressing site-specific or case-specific issues in a supplemental
report.3 ' Where the mitigation measures imposed under the program-
wide environmental impact report render any remaining impacts of the
specific project insignificant, the project may proceed under a
negative declaration. 32
This process creates a potential problem, however. Unlike the run-
of-the-mill environmental impact reports that apply only to a single
project, a program environmental impact report sets standards that
govern an entire class of projects.33 Such mitigation measures may
qualify as regulations under the California APA.
27. CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 21100 (West 2007 & Supp. 2015); CAL. CODE
REGS. TIT. 14, § 15132 (2015).
28. See CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 21081 (West 2007 & Supp. 2015); CAL. CODE
REGS. TIT. 14, §§ 15002(h), 15091(a), 15092(b), 15093(c) (2015).
29. Examples of such programs include the adoption of a general land use plan
and the implementation of a statewide regulatory program or policy. CAL. CODE
REGS. TIT. 14, § 15152(a) (2015).
30. See CAL. PUB. RES. CODE §21083 (West 2007 & Supp. 2015); CAL. CODE
REGS. TIT. 14, §§ 15152, 15385 (2015); see also CAL. PUB. RES. CODE §§ 21003,
21061, 21100 (West 2007 & Supp. 2015).
31. See Vineyard Area Citizens for Responsible Growth, Inc. v. City of
Rancho Cordova, 40 Cal. 4th 412, 431 (2007); Wimberger, supra note 21, at 520-21.
32. CAL. CODE REGS. TIT. 14, § 15152(f) (2015).
33. CAL. CODE REGS. TIT. 14, § 15168 (2015).
2015] 7
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II. THE CALIFORNIA APA FoRBIDs UNDERGROUND REGULATIONS
The California APA is more broadly applicable than its federal
counterpart.34 This broad statute's purpose is to ensure that "persons
or entities affected by a regulation . . . be heard on the merits in its
creation, and . . . have notice of the law's requirements so they can
conform their conduct accordingly." 5 It was founded on the
perception that there were too many regulations imposing unnecessary
burdens on the state and its people.3 6 The legislature also believed that
too many regulations were imposed in secret, therefore the California
APA's procedural protections were intended to "insure that due
process concerns are satisfied." 3  As the California Supreme Court
explained, increased public participation in the process also improves
the quality of regulations. 38
"The Legislature wisely perceived that the party subject to
regulation is often in the best position, and has the greatest incentive,
to inform the agency about possible unintended consequences of a
proposed regulation. Moreover public participation in the regulatory
process directs the attention of agency policymakers to the public they
serve, thus providing some security against bureaucratic tyranny." 39
34. See Armistead v. State Pers. Bd., 22 Cal. 3d 198, 201-02 (1978) (the
Legislature desired "to achieve in the California APA a much greater coverage of
rules than Congress sought in the federal APA.").
35. Morales v. Cal. Dep't of Corr. & Rehab., 168 Cal. App. 4th 729, 736
(2008).
36. See Voss v. Superior Court, 46 Cal. App. 4th 900, 908-09 (1996) ("The
APA was born out of the Legislature's perception there existed too many regulations
imposing greater than necessary burdens on the state and particularly upon small
businesses.").
37. See Dyna-Med, Inc. v. Fair Employment & Hous. Comm'n., 43 Cal. 3d
1379, 1420 (1987); see also Horn v. Cty. Of Ventura, 24 Cal. 3d 605, 621 (1979)
("[W]e should not encourage legislators and rulemakers who conceivably yearn for
a more comfortable past when often they did proceed without notice, without
hearing, in protective secrecy.").
38. See Tidewater Marine Western, Inc. v. Bradshaw, 14 Cal. 4th 557 (1996).
39. Tidewater Marine Western, Inc., 14 Cal. 4th at 568-69 (citing San Diego
Nursery Co. v. Agricultural Labor Relations Bd., 100 Cal. App. 3d 128, 142-43
(1979)).
8 [Vol. 52
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Due to the importance of those purposes, the courts resolve any
doubts about the statute's applicability in its favor.4 0
The California APA's requirements include: (1) public notice of
proposed and final regulations; 41 (2) an opportunity for public
comment; 42 (3) a public hearing, if requested; 4 3 (4) responses to public
comments; 44 and (5) submission of all regulations to an independent
agency - the Office of Administrative Law.4 5 Any person may
challenge any regulation as contrary to law or improperly
promulgated.4 6
Every regulation, unless within a narrow list of enumerated
exceptions, must be formally adopted through the California APA's
procedures. 47 The statute defines "regulation" very broadly as "every
rule, regulation, order, or standard of general application, or the
amendment, supplement, or revision of any rule, regulation, order, or
40. See Californians for Pesticide Reform v. Dep't of Pesticide Regulation,
184 Cal. App. 4th 887, 907-08 (2010) (citing Grier v. Kizer, 219 Cal. App. 3d 422,
439 (1990)); see also CAL. Gov'T CODE § 11346 (West 2005 & Supp. 2015) ("This
chapter shall not be superseded or modified by any subsequent legislation except to
the extent that such legislation shall do so expressly."); United Sys. of Ark. v.
Stamison, 63 Cal. App. 4th 1001, 1010 (1998) (citing Grier v. Kizer 219 Cal. App.
3d 422, 438 (1990)); Morales, 168 Cal. App. 4th at 736.
41. CAL. Gov'T CODE §§ 11346.4, 11346.5, 11346.2 (West 2005 & Supp.
2015). The required notice is significant. In addition to providing the complete text
of the proposed regulation, the notice must contain a statement of reasons for it and
identify the studies and other evidence supporting it. CAL. Gov'T CODE § 11346.2
(West).
42. CAL. Gov'T CODE § 11346.8 (West 2005 & Supp. 2015).
43. CAL. Gov'T CODE § 11346.8(a) (West 2005 & Supp. 2015).
44. CAL. Gov'T CODE §§ 11346.8, 11346.9 (West 2005 & Supp. 2015).
45. CAL. Gov'T CODE § 11347.3 (West 2005 & Supp. 2015); CAL. CODE
REGS. TIT. 1, § 250(a) (2015). The Office of Administrative Law reviews every
proposed regulation to ensure that it is consistent with the law, clear, and necessary.
CAL. Gov'T CODE §§ 11349.1, 11349.3 (West 2005 & Supp. 2015).
46. CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. § 1085 (West 2007 & Supp. 2015); see also CAL.
Gov'T CODE §11374 (West 2005) ("[N]o regulation adopted is valid or effective
unless consistent and not in conflict with the statute and reasonably necessary to
effectuate the purpose of the statute."); Clean Air Constituency v. California State
Air Res. Bd., 11 Cal. 3d 801, 815-16 (1974).
47. Center for Biological Diversity v. Dept. of Fish & Wildlife, 234 Cal. App.
4th 214, 259 (2015).
2015]1 9
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standard adopted by any state agency to implement, interpret, or make
specific the law enforced or administered by it, or to govern its
procedure." 48 The California Supreme Court has interpreted the term
"regulation" to include any rule that is "generally applicable" 49 and
implements, interprets, or makes specific the law enforced or
administered by the agency, or governing its procedures.5 0 This
definition is broader than the statute's federal counterpart because it
applies to any rule, not just "legislative" rules.5 '
The California APA contains a narrow list of regulations that are
exempt from its notice and public comment requirements. These are:
(1) a regulation adopted by an agency in the judicial or legislative
branch; 52 (2) a legal ruling issued by the Franchise Tax Board's
counsel or State Board of Equalization's counsel; 53 (3) a form or
instructions relating to the use of a form; 54 (4) a regulation that relates
only to the internal management of the state agency;5 5 (5) a regulation
48. CAL. Gov'T CODE § 11342.600 (West 2005 & Supp. 2015).
49. See Tidewater Marine Western, Inc. v. Bradshaw, 14 Cal. 4th 557, 570-71
(1996). "Generally applicable" refers to any rule that applies to all members of any
identifiable class, kind, or order, or declares how a certain class of cases will be
decided. See id.; Morning Star Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 38 Cal. 4th 324,
333-34 (2006). This includes essentially anything but the application of a
procedurally valid rule to a particular instance or individual.
50. See Tidewater Marine Western, 14 Cal. 4th at 570-77; see also Morning
Star Co., 38 Cal. 4th at 333-34.
51. See Michael Asimow, California Underground Regulations, 44 ADMIN. L.
REv. 43, 44 (1992). Asimow criticizes California's approach on the grounds that it
does more harm than good, by increasing costs on agencies' efforts to convey their
interpretations of the statutes they administer to the public subject to them. See id. at
55-62. He argues that interpretive rules do not affect the legal rights and obligations
of those subject to them, and thus don't raise the same concerns that legislative rules
do. See id. at 44. However, because courts defer to interpretive rules, Asimow's
premise is false. See Tidewater Marine Western, 14 Cal. 4th at 574-75 (criticizing
Asimow's argument on this basis).
52. CAL. Gov'T CODE § 11340.9(a) (West 2005 & Supp. 2015).
53. CAL. Gov'T CODE § 11340.9(b) (West 2005 & Supp. 2015).
54. CAL. Gov'T CODE § 11340.9(c) (West 2005 & Supp. 2015).
55. CAL. Gov'T CODE § 11340.9(d) (West 2005 & Supp. 2015). This
exemption is referred to as the "internal management" exemption and is exceedingly
narrow. In Armistead v. State Personnel Board, the California Supreme Court held
that it cannot exempt any rule that significantly affects people outside the agency,
10 [Vol. 52
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that establishes criteria or guidelines for agency staff to perform an
audit, investigation, examination, or inspection, settle a commercial
dispute, or negotiate a commercial arrangement;5 6 (6) a regulation that
embodies the only legally tenable interpretation of a provision of
law;5 7 (7) a regulation that establishes or fixes rates, prices, or
tariffs;5 1 (8) a regulation that relates to the use of public works; 59 and
(9) a regulation that is directed to a specific person or group and does
not apply generally throughout the state. 60
Any non-exempt regulation that has not been formally adopted
through the California APA's procedures is an "underground
regulation." 6 1 Agencies that adopt underground regulations face two
significant consequences. First, the agencies are categorically
prohibited from enforcing the underground regulation. 62  That
even if the regulation is only directly addressed to agency employees. See Armistead
v. State Pers. Bd., 22 Cal. 3d 198, 203-04 (1978) ("That [the regulation] is not
readily accessible to affected employees and the public does not persuade us that [it]
relates to internal management only. The section obviously was intended to be
generally applied. . . . In fact, the insistence on restricted access does indeed increase
our concern."); see also Morning Star Co., 38 Cal. 4th at 336 (2006) ("We decline to
endorse an approach that would allow an agency to avoid APA requirements simply
by driving its regulations further underground."); City of San Marcos v. Cal.
Highway Comm., 60 Cal. App. 3d 383, 408 (1976).
56. CAL. Gov'T CODE § 11340.9(e) (West 2005 & Supp. 2015).
57. CAL. Gov'T CODE § 11340.9(f) (West 2005 & Supp. 2015). This
exemption is referred to as the "lone legally tenable interpretation" exemption. It too
is exceedingly narrow. If the interpretation "depart[s] from, or embellish[es] upon,
express statutory authorization and language, the [agency] will need to promulgate
regulations." Engelmann v. State Bd. of Educ., 2 Cal. App. 4th 47, 62 (1991). This is
true even if the interpretation is the most reasonable one. Morning Star Co., 38 Cal.
4th at 336 ("Were this the case, the exception would swallow the rule."). The
exemption only applies if the law can be interpreted only one way, such that the
interpretation is "essentially rote, ministerial, or otherwise patently compelled by, or
repetitive of, the statute's plain language." Id. at 337 (citing Cal. Law Revision
Com., 32D West's Ann. Gov. Code (2005 ed.) foll. § 11340.9)).
58. CAL. Gov'T CODE § 11340.9(g) (West 2005 & Supp. 2015).
59. CAL. Gov'T CODE § 11340.9(h) (West 2005 & Supp. 2015).
60. CAL. Gov'T CODE § 11340.9(i) (West 2005 & Supp. 2015).
61. CAL. CODE REGS. TIT. 1, § 250 (2015).
62. CAL. Gov'T CODE § 11340.5(a) (West 2005 & Supp. 2015). The statute
requires any a regulation to be struck down if there is any substantial
noncompliance. CAL. Gov'T CODE § 11350 (West 2005 & Supp. 2015). This may
2015] 11I
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consequence occurs regardless of the regulation's purpose because the
Legislature has clearly stated that the California APA does not permit
implied exceptions. 63
Second, courts will not accord any deference to an agency's
interpretation of a statute contained in an underground regulation. 64
The California Supreme Court explained that "[t]o hold otherwise
would help to perpetuate the problem of avoidance by administrative
agencies of 'the mandatory requirements of the [APA] of public
notice, opportunity to be heard by the public, filing with the Secretary
of State, and publication in the [California Code of Regulations]."' 6 5
Consequently, and regardless of the agency's expertise in interpreting
and administering the statute, "courts in effect ignore the agency's
illegal regulation." 66 The courts' approach significantly distinguishes
the California APA from its federal counterpart, under which
interpretive regulations are exempt from notice-and-comment, but
nonetheless receive substantial deference.67
mean that the prohibition will not be triggered if an agency attempts to comply in
good faith but makes some minor error. But there has never been a case in which a
court found that happened. Rather, whenever the courts have found that the
California APA was violated, the regulation could not be enforced. See, e.g., Reilly
v. Superior Court, 57 Cal. 4th 641, 649 (2013).
63. See State Water Res. Control Bd. v. Office of Admin. Law, 12 Cal. App.
4th 697, 703-04 (1993).
64. See Armistead v. State Pers. Bd., 22 Cal. 3d 198, 204-05 (1978); see also
Yamaha Corp. of Am. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 19 Cal. 4th 1, 19-20 (1998).
65. Armistead, 22 Cal. 3d at 205.
66. Yamaha Corp. ofAm., 19 Cal. 4th at 20.
67. See Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co., 325 U.S. 410 (1945). This may
change, however. The Supreme Court has recently hinted that it may be
reconsidering the traditional deference accorded to regulations that do not undergo
notice and comment. See Perez v. Mortg. Bankers Ass'n, 135 S. Ct. 1199, 1210
(2015) (Alito, J., concurring); id. at 1211 (Scalia, J., concurring); id. at 1213
(Thomas, J., concurring). Scholars have called for the court to reject deference in
such circumstances. See, e.g., John F. Manning, Constitutional Structure and
Judicial Deference to Agency Interpretations of Agency Rules, 96 COLUM. L. REV.
612, 631-96 (1996). There also seems to be recent reluctance to apply more
traditional deference. See King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2488-89 (2015); Util.
Air Regulatory Grp. v. EPA, 134 S. Ct. 2427, 2444 (2014).
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III. THE CALIFORNIA APA APPLIES TO REGULATIONS ADOPTED
THROUGH CEQA
Mitigation measures adopted in program environmental impact
reports may implicate the prohibition against underground
regulations.6 8 When mitigation measures impose new standards that
will govern all applications of the program, these standards are
"underground environmental regulations."
A. The California APA and CEQA Contain Different
Procedural Requirements
At first, it may seem paradoxical to claim that a mitigation
measure could conflict with the California APA. CEQA is notorious
for imposing significant procedural delays on projects.69 One might
naturally expect that CEQA's and the California APA's procedures
would be largely redundant, but this is not so. Those two statutes
differ in many significant respects and the Legislature and the
California Supreme Court have made clear that procedural
requirements imposed under a separate statute do not exempt a
regulation from the California APA's mandates. 70 In California, the
68. CAL. CODE REGS. TIT. 14, § 15168 (2015).
69. Because of these burdens, CEQA has been a major source of litigation
abuse. See Jennifer L. Hernandez & David Friedman, In the Name of the
Environment: Litigation Abuse Under CEQA (Aug. 2015)
(http://www.hklaw.com/publications/in-the-name-of-the-environment-litigation-
abuse-under-ceqa-august-2015/); Katherine V. Mackey, Note, Reforming "The
Blob": Why Calfornia's Latest Approach to Amending CEQA Is a Bad Idea, 39
COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 357, 357-60 (2014); Stephen J. Dubner, Why Bad
Environmentalism Is Such an Easy Sell: A New Freakonomics Radio Podcast,
FREAKONOMICS.COM (Oct. 24, 2013) (http://freakonomics.com/2013/10/24/why-
bad-environmentalism-is-such-an-easy-sell-a-new-freakonomics-radio-podcast-2/);
George Skelton, Abuse pollutes state environmental law, L.A. TIMES (Mar. 11,
2013) (http://articles.latimes.com/2013/mar/I 1/local/la-me-cap-environment-
20130311).
70. See CAL. Gov'T CODE § 11346(a) (West 2005 & Supp. 2015) (California
APA's procedural requirements "shall not be superseded or modified by any
subsequent legislation except to the extent that the legislation shall do so
expressly."); Tidewater Marine Western, Inc. v. Bradshaw, 14 Cal. 4th 557, 568-69
(1996) (Industrial Welfare Commission regulations are subject to analogous
procedural requirements and expressly exempted from the California APA);
2015] 13
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only lawful way to adopt regulations is through the California APA's
procedures.
Due to of the vastly different purposes underlying the two
statutes, their procedural requirements differ in significant ways. The
California APA requires more detailed notice regarding the content of
the proposed regulation, its purposes, and the evidence supporting it
than CEQA.7n The California APA also requires agencies to exert
greater efforts to publicize proposed regulations. 72
The California APA also requires agencies to analyze a broader
array of issues than CEQA. Under the California APA, an agency has
an affirmative obligation to consider "the [regulation's] potential for
adverse economic impact on California business enterprises and
individuals,"73 and the impact on "creation or elimination of jobs" and
"creation of new businesses or the elimination of existing businesses"
within the state. 74 CEQA, by contrast, does not require any
consideration of economic impacts.75
Those substantive differences carry over to the agency's
obligation to respond to public comments. Under the California APA,
an agency must summarize every objection or recommendation made
during the public comment period "together with an explanation of
Mountain Lion Found. v. Fish & Game Com.; 16 Cal. 4th 105, 133-34 (1997)
(compliance with California APA's procedures does not imply compliance with
CEQA).
71. Compare CAL. Gov'T CODE § 11346.2 (West 2005 & Supp. 2015)
(requiring the notice to contain the express terms of the regulation and studies
supporting it) with CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 21092(b)(1) (West 2007 & Supp. 2015)
(requiring only a brief description of the proposal); see CAL. Gov'T CODE § 11346.5
(West 2005 & Supp. 2015) (requiring agencies to identify the statutory authorization
for any proposed regulation and the types of businesses likely affected by the
regulation's significant adverse economic impacts).
72. Compare CAL. GOv'T CODE § 11346.4(a) (West 2005 & Supp. 2015)
(requiring notice to a representative number of small businesses, publication in the
California Regulatory Notice Register, and publication on the agency's Web site)
with CAL. PUB. RES. CODE §21092(b)(3) (West 2007 & Supp. 2015) (requiring
either publication in a newspaper, posting of notice at affected sites, or direct
mailing to affected property owners).
73. CAL. Gov'T CODE § 11346.3(a) (West 2005 & Supp. 2015).
74. CAL. Gov'T CODE §11346.3(b)(1) (West 2005 & Supp. 2015).
75. CAL. CODE REGS. TIT. 14, § 15358 (2015) ("Effects analyzed under CEQA
must be related to a physical change.").
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how the proposed action has been changed to accommodate each
objection or recommendation, or the reasons for making no change,"
regardless of the subject of the public comment.76 CEQA, however,
myopically focuses on environmental impacts; an agency must only
respond to public comments that address environmental issues.7 7
Finally, the California APA contains a unique requirement:
agencies must submit regulations to the Office of Administrative Law
for review of their "necessity, authority, clarity, consistency,
reference, and nonduplication.'s If a proposed regulation fails any of
the criteria, it is returned to the agency and, if any significant changes
are required, the promulgation process may have to begin anew. 7 9
B. Program EIRs are Particularly Likely to Contain Underground
Environmental Regulations
A survey of existing program environmental impact reports
highlights the particular seriousness of this issue. Not only is there a
significant risk that many program EIRS may contain underground
environmental regulations, but they also deal with significant
environmental and human health issues. Discussion of examples of the
types of programs that may be affected highlights this issue.
In March 2012, the Department of Fish and Wildlife" approved a
supplemental environmental impact report for its suction dredge
permitting program.8 1 This report found that suction dredge mining8 2
76. CAL. Gov'T CODE § 11346.9(a)(3) (West 2005 & Supp. 2015).
77. CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 21091(d)(2)(A) (West 2007 & Supp. 2015).
78. CAL. Gov'T CODE § 11349.1(a) (West 2005 & Supp. 2015).
79. CAL. Gov'T CODE § 11349.4(a) (West 2005).
80. Prior to 2013, the Department of Fish and Wildlife was named the
Department of Fish and Game. To avoid confusion, this article will refer to the
Department only using its current name.
81. California Department of Fish and Game, Suction Dredge Permitting
Program: Final Subsequent Environmental Impact Report (Mar. 2012) [hereinafter
Suction Dredge EIR], https://www.wildlife.ca.gov/Licensing/Suction-Dredge-
Permits; see CAL. FISH & GAME CODE §§ 5653, 5653.1 (West 2013 & Supp. 2015);
CAL. CODE REGS., TIT. 14 §§ 228, 228.5 (2015).
82. Suction dredge mining involves the use of a motorized pump and hose to
suck up streambed materials, which is then run through a sluice box to trap gold and
other dense materials, after which the water and remaining sediment is dumped back
2015] 15
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can increase noise pollution, destabilize streambeds, stir up mercury
and other materials contained in streambeds, interfere with fish and
other protected wildlife, and disturb cultural resources. 83 To address
these concerns, to the extent of the Department's statutory authority, 84
the environmental impact report proposed several regulations
governing the number of permits, reporting requirements, and time,
place, and manner restrictions.8 5
The State Water Resources Control Board prepared a program
environmental report addressing the environment impacts of biosolids
when used as fertilizers.86 That report found that uncontrolled land
application of biosolids could have several significant adverse
environmental impacts such as polluting groundwater, poisoning fish,
depleting protected wildlife, contaminating food, and exposing
residents and agricultural workers to radionuclides.8 7 To mitigate
these impacts, the report established screening and reporting
requirements, grazing restrictions, and restrictions on chemical
buildups in the soil.88
The Department of Conservation prepared a programmatic
environmental impact report addressing the environmental impacts of
into the stream. See Adrianne DelCotto, Suction Dredge Mining: The United States
Forest Service Hands Miners the Golden Ticket, 40 ENVTL. L. 1021, 1026-27
(2010).
83. Suction Dredge EIR at 5-61.
84. The Department only has statutory authority to regulate suction dredge
mining to ensure that it is not deleterious to fish. CAL. FISH & GAME CODE §
5653(b) (West 2013 & Supp. 2015). Since the Department has no current statutory
authority to adopt regulations to address the other significant environmental impacts,
the state legislature has enacted a moratorium on suction dredge mining until
legislation is enacted giving the Department sufficient authority to regulate this
mining's impacts. Id. §§ 5653, 5653.1; see People v. Rinehart, 230 Cal. App. 4th
419 (2014), review granted (Cal. Jan. 21, 2015) (federal preemption challenge to the
moratorium).
85. Suction Dredge EIR at 1-2-1-4.
86. California State Water Resources Control Board, Final Statewide Program
EIR Covering General Waste Discharge Requirements for Biosolids Land
Application (June 2004), http://www.swrcb.ca.gov/water issues/programs/
biosolids/peir.shtml. (Introduction)
87. See id. at ES-14.
88. See id
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oil and gas well stimulation treatments, i.e,. fracking. 89 The report
found that fracking, in addition to posing risks of spills, could have
adverse impacts on air quality, fish, wildlife, vegetation, greenhouse
gas emissions, and water quality.90 To address these impacts, the
report adopted several mitigation measures, including restrictions on
which water sources may be used, how wells are designed, how close
wells can be to various areas, and requirements to install protective
devices to reduce impacts to biological or water resources. 91
Another example includes the Department of Fish and Wildlife's
program environmental impact report governing state and private fish
stocking in waters throughout California. 9 2 The report identified
impacts on several amphibian and fish species from predation and
competition for food, increased risk of invasive species, and potential
impacts to water quality.93 To address these concerns, the fish
stocking report proposed several mitigation measures, including new
requirements for two programs administered by the department. 4 The
report modified the "Fishing in the City" program, through which the
Department encouraged fishing opportunities for urban residents by
imposing a new evaluation protocol to determine which water bodies
would be stocked with fish. The report also required participating
businesses to adopt monitoring and reporting programs to ensure that
89. California Department of Conservation, Analysis of Oil and Gas Well
Stimulation Treatments in California: Final Environmental Impact Report (June
2015), http://www.conservation.ca.gov/dog/ Pages/SB4_FinalEIRTOC.aspx.
90. See id. ES-8-2 1.
91. See id. The Department has since identified these measures as underground
environmental regulations and acknowledged they must be formally promulgated.
See Department of Conservation, SB 4 EIR Certification Statement (July 1, 2015),
ftp://ftp.consrv.ca.gov/pub/oil/SB4EIR/Documents/
SB%204%20EIR%20Supervisor%27s%20Certification%20Statement.pdf.
92. California Department of Fish and Wildlife, Final Environmental Impact
Report for Hatchery Operations (Jan. 11, 2010),
https://www.dfg.ca.gov/fish/Hatcheries/EIR/.
93. See id. at ES-6.
94. See Center for Biological Diversity v. Dept. of Fish & Wildlife, 234 Cal.
App. 4th 214, 258-59 (2015); see also Fish Stocking EIR, supra note 92.
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their facilities were free of invasive species. 95 The mitigation
measures also included new requirements for obtaining a private
stocking permit - which is required to stock fish in any water,
including private ponds or lakes - by mandating that a Department
biologist apply an evaluation protocol to determine whether the stock
fishing would impact any of the "decision species." 96
Because each of those program environmental impact reports
adopt mitigation measures that will apply to all of the decisions made
under the program, the programs appear to implicate the California
APA. However, the mitigation measures probably do not implicate
the California APA due to anything specific to them, but rather due to
the nature of a program environmental impact report.
C. The California APA Applies to Underground
Environmental Regulations
Until recently, mitigation measures had never been challenged as
underground environmental regulations. In Center for Biological
Diversity v. Department bf Fish and Wildlife,97 an organization
representing recreational fishermen and associated businesses
challenged the mitigation measures adopted in the fish stocking
environmental impact report discussed above. 98 In adopting these
mitigation measures, the Department of Fish and Wildlife did not
follow the California APA's procedures. 99 During litigation, the
Department did not deny that the mitigation measures fell under the
statute's definition of regulations, but argued that they were
exempt.' 00
95. See Center for Biological Diversity, 234 Cal. App. 4th at 224, see also
California Department of Fish and Wildlife, Fishing in the City Program Overview,
https://www.wildlife.ca.gov/Fishing-in-the-City/Overview.
96. See Center for Biological Diversity, 234 Cal. App. 4th at 230; see also
CAL. FISH & GAME CODE § 6401 (West 2013) (requiring a permit to stock fish);
CAL. CODE REGS., TIT. 14, § 238.5 (2015) (regulation governing fish stocking
permits).
97. Center for Biological Diversity, 234 Cal. App. 4th 214.
98. Id. at 225.
99. See id. at 225-31.
100. See id. at 260.
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The Department could not have argued that the mitigation
measures were not regulations under the California APA. Those
mitigation measures established an evaluation protocol that dictated
whether and how waters across the state would be stocked by the state
or private entities.101 The mitigation measures also imposed ongoing
monitoring and reporting requirements on all private aquaculture
facilities. 102 The mitigation measures easily satisfied Tidewater's two-
part test.103 The measures were generally applicable because the
protocol applied to every stocking decision and the monitoring
requirement would be imposed on every facility in the state. 104 Also,
by imposing requirements on stocking decisions and aquaculture
facilities, the measures implemented, interpreted, or made specific the
law being enforced.00 Consequently, the court held that the California
APA applies to regulations adopted as mitigation measures under
CEQA.1 0 6
The court also rejected the exemption defenses on grounds that
indicate that the exemptions will rarely, if ever, insulate mitigation
measures from attack under the California APA.1 07 The Department
argued that the internal management exemption applied to the
evaluation protocol for government stocking because it was directed
to the Department's own biologists. 08 The Department acknowledged
that stocking decisions affect third parties, such as vendors and urban
residents who rely on the state-stocked waters for recreation. 109 But,
the Department argued that those impacts were incidental and thus
should not forbid application of the internal management
exemption.1 10 For this argument, the Department relied on
Californians for Pesticide Reform v. California Department of
101. Fish Stocking EIR at 4-210-211, 4-214215.
102. See id at 4-211-212.
103. See Tidewater Marine Western, Inc. v. Bradshaw, 14 Cal. 4th 557, 570-
77 (1996).
104. Center for Biological Diversity, 234 Cal. App 4th at 261-62.
105. See id. at 262-64.
106. Id. at 225.
107. Id. at 259-64.
108. Id. at 260.
109. See id.
110. See id
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Pesticide Regulation,"II which construed the exemption to apply to an
"agency's rule [that] does not require the individuals or entities
affected to do anything they are not already required to do." 112
The application of this exemption brings up an important question
because most agencies could argue that their mitigation measures
(provided the measures were crafted properly) regulate their own
employees and only incidentally affect third parties. Almost any
mitigation measure could be framed as a requirement that mandates an
agency official to consider certain factors when exercising
discretionary authority to grant a permit or permission for private
action. Under the Department's argument, such mitigation measures
would categorically escape review under the California APA.
Perhaps unsurprisingly, the Court of Appeal did not find this giant
loophole in the California APA. Rather, the court narrowly interpreted
Californians for Pesticide Reform11 3 to only apply to internal agency
policies that do not impose new duties on the agency or any member
of the public that would substantively affect a public program." 4 The
evaluation protocol "significantly affects numerous citizens, both
those who run established fish stocking businesses and those,
especially children, who enjoy participating in the program.""'s I
light of these significant external impacts, the California APA's aim,
providing affected parties -an opportunity to be heard, would be
111. Californians for Pesticide Reform v. Cal. Dept. of Pesticide Regulation,
184 Cal. App. 4th 887 (2010).
112. See Center for Biological Diversity, 234 Cal. App. 4th at 260; see also
Californians for Pesticide Reform, 184 Cal. App. 4th at 909. Californians for
Pesticide Reform upheld an agency's policy to prioritize certain pesticides for
toxicity reviews under a statute that mandated the review of all pesticides. See
Californians for Pesticide Reform, 184 Cal. App. 4th at 893 -94. According to that
decision, this policy falls within the internal management exception because it "will
not determine if the pesticides will undergo review, but merely prioritize when the
pesticides will undergo review." Id. at 909. Consequently, the policy did not impose
any new duties on the agency or any member of the public, but merely provided for
the optimum allocation of the agency's resources to perform a preexisting duty. See
id.
113. See Californians for Pesticide Reform, 184 Cal. App. 4th at 887.
114. See Center for Biological Diversity, 234 Cal. App. 4th at 261.
115. See id.; see also Armistead v. State Pers. Bd., 22 Cal. 3d 198, 204-05
(1978).
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frustrated if the mitigation measure could be enforced without going
through the statute's procedures." 6
That reasoning should generally foreclose agency reliance on the
internal management exception when defending underground
environmental regulations. Any such regulation would likely have
some significant impact on a third party, either the person subject to
the regulation or someone else related to the program. After all, if the
regulation did not affect parties external to the agency, it would not
mitigate any significant environmental impacts.
The Department also argued that the mitigation measures were
exempt from the California APA as the only legally tenable
interpretation of existing law.'1 7 The Department pointed to several
statutes and regulations related to fish stocking's environmental
impacts and argued that it could only reconcile these numerous
obligations through the proposed mitigation measures." The
Department's argument was not a traditional argument for the
exemption. The Department did not, for instance, argue that a statute
or regulation expressly compelled any of the mitigation measures.11 9
Instead, the Department made a practical argument - the Department
needed the mitigation measures to satisfy its obligations under CEQA
and many other statutes and regulations.1 20
That argument too, if successful, would have exempted many, if
not all, underground regulations from the California APA. An agency
would only have to point to CEQA's obligation to mitigate
environmental impacts and any other relevant statutory or regulatory
restrictions and then assert that the mitigation measures were the only
means to comply with all of the requirements.
This argument, if accepted, could have the consequence of
shifting the burden of persuasion from the agency to the plaintiff
challenging the underground environmental regulation. The
116. See Center for Biological Diversity, 234 Cal. App. 4th at 262.
117. See id. at 262.
118. See id. at 262-63; see also 16 U.S.C. § 1531 (Endangered Species Act)
(2012); CAL. FISH & GAME CODE § 2301(a) (West 2013 & Supp. 2015); CAL. CODE
REGS., TIT. 14, § 671 (2015); CAL. CODE REGS., TIT. 14, § 238.5 (2015).
119. See Center for Biological Diversity, 234 Cal. App. 4th at 262-63 (2015).
120. See id.
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Department's argument implied that the challenger must articulate
some alternative regulation that complied with existing laws.'21
The Court of Appeal was not persuaded, however. Instead, the
court reaffirmed that the exemption only applies to regulations that are
patently compelled by existing law or regulation such that the
interpretation is essentially rote or ministerial. 122 The mitigation
measure imposing monitoring and reporting requirements for invasive
species was not compelled by a statute that forbade possession or
transfer of those species and required any species found to be reported
to the Department.1 23 Although the mitigation measure might have
been the most practical means of enforcing that requirement, it was
not the only legally tenable way to do so.1 24 The court similarly
rejected the application of the exemption to an evaluation protocol for
private fish stocking permits.1 25 Though several laws restricted private
stocking and the Department's permitting decisions, the particular
protocol contained in the underground regulation was not set out in
any of them.1 26
As a consequence, agencies that adopt underground
environmental regulations will rarely, if ever, be able to rely on the
lone legally tenable interpretation exemption. This exemption is no
broader in those circumstances than any other, notwithstanding
CEQA's requirements to mitigate.
IV. WHAT ARE THE CONSEQUENCES OF PROHIBITING UNDERGROUND
ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATIONS?
Consistent with the California APA's purpose, the prohibition
against underground environmental regulations is likely to be
121. See id.
122. See id. at 262-63; Morning Star Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 38 Cal.
4th 324, 336 (2006).
123. See Center for Biological Diversity, 234 Cal. App. 4th at 262; see also
CAL. FISH & GAME CODE § 2301(a) (West 2013 & Supp. 2015); CAL. CODE REGS.,
TIT. 14, § 671 (2015).
124. See Centerfor Biological Diversity, 234 Cal. App. 4th at 262-63.
125. See id. at 263-64.
126. See id; see also CAL. CODE REGS., TIT. 14, § 238.5 (2015).
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deregulatory over all.1 27 Three changes will contribute to that
deregulatory effect: (1) agencies must address all consequences of
their regulations; (2) the Office of Administrative Law must review
the regulation's mitigation measures; and (3) any person may obtain
judicial review of a regulation's rationale.
First, the California APA, unlike CEQA, requires agencies to
address all consequences of their regulations, not just environmental
ones. 128 Thus, the public will have an opportunity to raise more issues
in the promulgation process, including the costs and burdens
associated with mitigation measures. 129 Also, the agency will have to
grapple with those impacts.' 30
Under CEQA, agencies give little consideration to the costs of
mitigation.131 So long as mitigation measures are "feasible," they can
be imposed. 13 2 Under this feasibility standard, however, agencies do
not carefully weigh the costs and benefits of regulation. A mitigation
measures is "feasible" if it is capable of being accomplished in a
reasonable time. 133 For example, a mitigation measure that costs 10
dollars for every I dollar of environmental benefit is feasible, but not
advisable. In fact, agencies have little incentive to consider efficiency
because CEQA does not require agencies to respond to comments
criticizing compliance costs.
127. See CAL. Gov'T CODE § 11340 (West 2005 & Supp. 2015) (legislative
findings of "an unprecedented growth in the number of administrative regulations"
which are "frequently unclear and unnecessarily complex" and "confusing to the
persons who must comply," resulting in an "unnecessary burden on California
citizens," "discourage[ing] innovation, research, and development of improved
means of achieving desirable social goals.").
128. See supra notes 71-77.
129. See CAL. Gov'T CODE §§ 11346.2, 11346.45, 11346.9(a)(3) (West 2005
& Supp. 2015).
130. See CAL. Gov'T CODE § 11346.9 (West 2005 & Supp. 2015); see also
Sebastian Medvei, Lifting the Veil: Why California Environmental Impact Reports
Should Provide More Non-environmental Information When Determining the
Feasibility ofAlternatives to Developments, 42 Sw. L. REv. 737, 737-38 (2013).
131. See CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 21100 (West 2007 & Supp. 2015).
132. See id.; Laurel Heights Improvement Assn. v. Regents of Univ. of Cal.,
47 Cal. 3d 376, 400-01 (1988).
133. CAL. CODE REGS., TIT. 14, § 15364 (2015).
134. See CAL. PUB. RES. CODE §21091 (West 2007 & Supp. 2015).
2015] 23
24
California Western Law Review, Vol. 52 [2015], No. 1, Art. 2
https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwlr/vol52/iss1/2
CALIFORNIA WESTERN LAW REVIEW
By reducing the risk that regulations will impose substantial costs
with meager benefits, the obligation to consider and respond to public
concerns regarding costs and burdens associated with underground
environmental regulations will likely cause agencies to behave more
rationally.' 35 That result will probably also change how mitigation
measures are expressed because it will encourage performance
standards over prescriptive standards.' 36
Second, the California APA will require the Office of
Administrative Law to review regulatory mitigation measures. 137
According to Asimow, this is a significant check and may explain why
many agencies have adopted underground regulations. 138 The review
requires agencies to demonstrate that mitigation measures are
necessary, statutorily authorized, clear, and not duplicative.1 39 Under
CEQA, no independent agency reviews the data and policy arguments
to determine whether the new regulation is necessary. 140 Instead, only
the agency that will exercise this authority, which has little incentive
to keep its own power in check, considers that question.'41
Finally, if appeals to the agency and Office of Administrative Law
do not yield any results, anyone may obtain judicial review of the
rationale behind the regulation. Although judicial review in the
context of a challenge to an agency's weighing of a regulation's costs
and benefits is deferential, some review is better than nothing. Under
CEQA, one cannot challenge a mitigation measure on the grounds that
it does not satisfy cost-benefit analysis.1 42
Center for Biological Diversity may be a somewhat unique case.
The private stocking permit program is ministerial - if the permit is
135. Cf Michigan v. EPA, 135 S. Ct. 2699, 2707 (2015) ("One would not say
that it is even rational, never mind 'appropriate,' to impose billions of dollars in
economic costs in return for a few dollars in health or environmental benefits.").
136. See CAL. GOV'T CODE § 11340(d) (West 2005 & Supp. 2015).
137. CAL. Gov'T CODE §§ 11349.1, 11349.3 (West 2005 & Supp. 2015).
138. Asimow, supra note 51, at 55-62.
139. See CAL. Gov'T CODE § 11349.1(a) (West 2005 & Supp. 2015).
140. See Sierra Club v. Cal. Coastal Comm'n, 35 Cal. 4th 839, 859-60 (2005);
see also CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 21004 (West 2007 & Supp. 2015).
141. See id.
142. See CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 21100 (West 2007 & Supp. 2015).
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consistent with the valid regulations governing the program, 143 the
Department must grant it. As a consequence, the invalidation of the
underground regulations allows the program to continue as it had
before its illegal adoption. Thus, judicial recognition of underground
environmental regulations was clearly deregulatory in that case.
However, judicial recognition of underground environmental
regulations can also come w7ith some costs, particularly where the
program is not ministerial. Failure to implement mitigation imposed
under CEQA can result in an injunction against further
implementation of the program.144 Because agencies will be required
to jump through additional procedural hoops before implementing
mitigation measures, those affected by a program may experience
additional uncertainty, delay, and associated costs. 14 5 Depending on
the program, the additional uncertainty, delay, and costs may be
extremely important. If the program involves permitting a time-
sensitive activity, a delay of a few months may set the program back
much longer. For instance, farmers who must plant and fertilize their
crops at a particular time of year may lose out on an entire crop if the
state cannot permit the use of fertilizers while it formally promulgates
regulations.1 46 Similarly, uncertainty can be quite taxing on program
participants. Industries that must make investments in anticipation of
future regulation, for instance, face the prospect of wasting investment
in safeguards if the formally promulgated regulation differs
substantially from what was anticipated in the environmental impact
report.1 4 7
143. CAL. CODE REGS. TIT. 14, § 238.5 (2015).
144. See Laurel Heights Improvement Assn. v. Regents of University of
California, 47 Cal. 3d 376, 423 (1988) (traditional equitable principles guide the
decision whether to enjoin a project while an agency corrects CEQA errors).
145. CEQA's procedures alone already impose substantial delay and costs on
participants. See Varner, supra note 5, at 1483-85.
146. California State Water Resources Control Board, Final Statewide
Program EIR Covering General Waste Discharge Requirements for Biosolids Land
Application (June 2004), 14-15, http://www.swrcb.ca.gov/waterissues/
programs/biosolids/peir.shtml.
147. Note that this is true regardless of whether the regulation ultimately
adopted is more burdensome or less than what was expected. Any change that
would make past investments inefficient would have these impacts. Industries that
252015]
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At first blush then, prohibiting underground environmental
regulations may increase the risk that a program will have to be
suspended during the period between the recognition of significant
environmental impacts and the promulgation of a regulation under the
California APA. In the recent environmental impact report analyzing
fracking throughout the state, for instance, the Department of
Conservation concluded that it could not finalize and implement
several mitigation measures because the measures would be
underground environmental regulations. 14 8  Consequently, only
mitigation measures that do not constitute regulations will be
implemented until formal regulations are adopted.1 4 9 Fortunately, the
Department of Conservation prepared that environmental impact
report pursuant to a specific piece of legislation and, it appears, that
delay will not translate into a moratorium.15 0 However, if that
fortunate result had not occurred, the state's economy would likely
have been substantially affected because fracking, which is
responsible for 20 percent of the oil produced in the state, 15 ' would
have stopped until those regulations were adopted. That delay would
stand to lose significant amount from such changes are likely to delay making these
investments, exacerbating the delay problem.
148. Department of Conservation, SB 4 EIR Certification Statement, 3-4 (July
1, 2015), ftp://ftp.consrv.ca.gov/pub/oil/SB4EIR/Documents/SB%204%20EIR%
20Supervisor/o27s%2OCertification%2OStatement.pdf.
149. See id.
150. Id. at 4-8. Perhaps unsurprisingly, the Department of Conservation was
promptly sued after finalizing its environmental impact report. See Center for
Biological Diversity v. California Department of Conservation, No. 34-2015-
800002149-CU-WM-GDS (Sacramento Sup. Ct. filed July 30, 2015). However, the
complaint does not appear to challenge the decision not to implement the
underground environmental regulations. See Complaint, Center for Biological
Diversity v. California Department of Conservation, No. 34-2015-800002149-CU-
WM-GDS (Sacramento Sup. Ct. filed July 30, 2015), http://www.
califomiaenvironmentallawblog.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/449/2015/07/15-7-
28-SB4_frackingpetition.pdf.
151. California Council on Science and Technology, Independent Scientific
Assessment of Well Stimulation in California, Vol. 1, at i (Jan. 2015),
http://ccst.us/publications/2015/2015SB4-v1ES.pdf.
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have resulted in the loss of about 40 million barrels, 152 worth
approximately $160 million. 15 3
What options, other than those that would lead to litigation under
the California APA or CEQA, does an agency have to avoid
suspending implementation of a program while it formally adopts
regulations? One option would be to frame the mitigation measure as
a vague requirement that the agency consider and, if appropriate,
adopt regulations to mitigate any environmental impact. Such an
approach would be fully consistent with the California APA, but could
expose the agency to challenge under CEQA. CEQA states that
mitigation measures should be "fully enforceable" 154 and someone
might challenge such an aspirational mitigation measure as being
inconsistent with that requirement.
Another potential option to reduce that risk would be framing the
mitigation measure as a requirement that the agency adopt a particular
regulation on an emergency basis while it pursues formal adoption of
permanent regulations. The California APA allows state agencies to
impose emergency regulations immediately, for up to 180 days, if
necessary to avoid serious harm to the public peace, health, safety, or
general welfare. 155 Such regulations can be readopted for up to two
additional ninety day periods.156 That approach could provide an
agency with a maximum of six months to formally promulgate the
regulation. Although that procedure was designed to allow agencies to
proceed while complying with California APA's procedures, the
allotted time may be insufficient. The procedure may not provide the
agency with enough time to complete that process if the regulation is
152. California Department of Conservation, Well Counts and Production of
Oil, Gas, and Water by County - 2013, ftp://ftp.consrv.ca.gov/
pub/oil/annual reports/2013/2013%2OCounty%20Production.pdf.
153. See California Energy Commission, Alaska North Slope Crude Oil Prices
2005-July 2015, http://energyalmanac.ca.gov/petroleum/ans-crude prices/
index.html.
154. CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 21081.6(b) (West 2007 & Supp. 20t5); see also
CAL. CODE REGS., TIT. 14, § 15126.4(a)(2) (2015); Vineyard Area Citizens for
Responsible Growth, Inc. v. City of Rancho Cordova, 40 Cal. 4th 412, 444 (2007).
155. CAL. Gov'T CODE §§ 11342.545 (West Supp. 2015), 11346.1(h) (West
2005 & Supp. 2015); CAL. CODE REGS. TIT. 1, § 48 (2015).
156. CAL. Gov'T CODE § 11346.1(h) (West 2005 & Supp. 2015).
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complex or significantly affects stakeholders. The agency may also
face a challenge under CEQA on the grounds that, because the
emergency regulation is only temporary, the mitigation is not "fully
enforceable." The agency may also face a challenge under the
California APA if the mitigation measure effectively pre-commits the
agency to adopting a particular regulation.
An agency would be better off by acknowledging in the
environmental impact report that it cannot impose requirements absent
formal regulations. That would prevent the agency from fully
mitigating the impacts of the program. The agency could also adopt a
statement of overriding consideration to allow the program to continue
while the agency separately promulgated regulations. CEQA does not
require the agency to delay or temporarily suspend a program if the
delay would result in substantial adverse impacts to the state, its
industries, or program participants.`7 Rather, the agency may allow
the program to proceed if economic, legal, social, technological, or
other considerations make mitigation unfeasible and "specific
overriding economic, legal, social, technological, or other benefits of
the project outweigh the significant effects on the environment."15 8
In the suction dredge mining environmental impact report, for
instance, the Department of Fish & Wildlife concluded that it did not
have statutory authority to impose measures required to fully mitigate
the impacts of the mining. 159 By statute, the Department is limited to
regulating suction dredge mining to ensure that such mining does not
harm fish.1 6 0 Consequently, the Department acknowledged that it
could not feasibly mitigate some environmental impacts in light of its
limited statutory authority. 1 6 1 Having regulated all of the impacts that
it could, the Department found that overriding economic, legal, social,
157. CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 21081 (West 2007 & Supp. 2015); see CAL.
CODE REGS., TIT. 14, §§ 15043, 15091, 15093 (2015).
158. CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 21081 (West 2007 & Supp. 2015).
159. See supra note 81, at 3-56-3-68.
160. Dredges and Dredging - Licenses and Permits - Rules and
Regulations, S.B. No. 637, Cal. 2015 Legis. Serv. (West).
161. See supra note 84 and accompanying text.
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and other benefits outweighed the remaining impacts.' 62 Suction
dredge mining is a unique case, however, because the state legislature
imposed a permanent moratorium on the use of suction dredges until
regulations fully mitigating the dredging's impacts can be finalized,
which will require additional legislation.' 63
In most cases in which delay in implementing a program would
unduly burden the state or program participants, an agency should
easily be able to satisfy the standard for adopting a statement of
overriding consideration under CEQA. First, the agency must show
that full mitigation is infeasible.1 64 The agency could find that the
California APA's prohibition against underground environmental
regulation is a "specific . .. legal . . . consideration" that makes
imposition of such mitigation measures infeasible. 165 That
consideration is not dissimilar from the Department of Fish and
Wildlife's conclusion that suction dredge mining mitigation measures
were infeasible because the Department lacked statutory authority to
enforce the measures. In either case, the law forbids the agency from
imposing the identified mitigation measure, rendering enforcement
infeasible. 166
Next, the agency would have to determine whether "specific
overriding economic, legal, social, techn6logical, or other benefits of
the project outweigh the significant effects on the environment."1 67
Courts review such decisions deferentially because balancing those
policy considerations "lies at the core of the lead agency's
discretionary responsibility under CEQA and is, for that reason, not
162. See California Department of Fish & Wildlife, Findings of Fact as Lead
Agency for the Suction Dredge Permitting Program, 53-54 (Mar. 16, 2012),
https://nrm.dfg.ca.gov/FileHandler.ashx?DocumentlD=44270&inline=1.
163. See supra note 85, at 1-4-5.
164. See Kenneth Mebane Ranches v. Superior Court, 10 Cal. App. 4th 276,
291 (1992) (citing Golden Gate Bridge etc. Dist. v. Muzzi, 83 Cal. App. 3d 707, 713
(1978)).
165. CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 21081(a)(3) (West 2007 & Supp. 2015).
166. See Sierra Club v. Cal. Coastal Comm'n, 35 Cal. 4th 839, 858-62 (2005);
see also Stephen L. Kostka & Michael H. Zischke, Practice Under the California
Environmental Quality Act § 14.25 (CEB 2013).
167. CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 21081(b) (West 2007 & Supp. 2015).
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lightly to be overturned."1 68 So long as the agency demonstrates that it
considered all of the benefits of the program and its impacts, and the
decision is supported by substantial evidence, the program will be
upheld.1 6 9 The agency's decision could be based on a statutory duty to
implement the program, if there is one;' 70 the economic consequences
of delay; the distributional consequences of delay, particularly if the
program affects poor or underserved communities; or any other
legitimate policy grounds that weigh in favor of allowing the agency
to continue implementing the program while separately pursuing
adoption of new regulations.
One of the main benefits of this approach is that the agency's
ability to separately adopt emergency regulations or formally
promulgate permanent regulations will not be prejudiced. The
approach also would not bind the agency if, during the process of
promulgating those regulations, the agency discovered that the
regulations were ill advised or there were unforeseen alternatives that
more efficiently mitigate the program's impacts. That is precisely why
the California APA mandates the procedures it does. Regulated parties
not only have access to greater information regarding the
consequences of regulations, but also have incentives to bring those
consequences to light. Government bureaucrats, on the other hand,
may only be able to speculate about the consequences of their
regulations, particularly if those consequences are outside their area of
expertise.
CONCLUSION
Individuals and businesses regulated by, or participating in, state
programs should welcome judicial recognition that the California
APA applies to regulations adopted under CEQA documents.
Prohibiting underground environmental regulations will result in
agencies being unable to impose burdensome new requirements
168. See City of Marina v. Bd. of Trustees of the Cal. State Univ., 39 Cal. 4th
341, 368 (2006).
169. See California Native Plan Soc. v. City of Santa Cruz, 177 Cal. App. 4th
957, 983 (2009); Concerned Citizens of South Central Los Angeles v. Los Angeles
Unified School Dist., 24 Cal. App. 4th 826, 849 (1994).
170. See id.
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without first submitting the requirements to full notice, comment, and
review by the Office of Administrative Law. At a minimum, that will
ensure that agencies must acknowledge and address the broader
impacts of such mitigation measures, rather than only considering
their environmental impacts.
However, that result may also result in added delay and
uncertainty for individuals affected by statewide programs. Agencies
have several options to mitigate those consequences, including
changing how they frame mitigation measures, using emergency
regulations, and adopting statements of overriding considerations.
Judicious use of these options will help ensure that the California
APA furthers its purpose of reducing regulatory burdens, rather than
exacerbating them by unnecessarily stalling implementation of
government programs.
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